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Summary	
This	paper	examines	who	populates	the	expert	and	policy	network	around	demographic	change	issues	in	
Europe.	We	examine	how	competing	policy	departments	in	the	European	Commission	Directorates-
General	(DGs)	deal	with	the	issue	of	Europe’s	changing	demography,	as	well	as	discuss	the	role	of	
external	experts	on	demographic	change.	Our	findings	suggest	that	on	demographic	change	issues	at	the	
EU	level,	DG	EMPL	has	taken	the	lead,	while	DG	ECFIN	is	the	secondary	actor.	Still,	internal	European	
Commission	dynamics	mean	that	the	lead	actor	on	demographic	issues	has	less	autonomy	in	articulating	
a	funded	and	clear	policy	position	on	how	to	address	them.	As	a	consequence,	there	is	little	institutional	
memory	and	hardly	a	depository	of	activity	on	demographic	change.	While	outside	expertise	comes	
primarily	from	demographers,	and	other	scholars	concerned	with	demographic	change,	they	are	
primarily	an	academic	community	rather	than	heavily	engaged	in	European	policy	formulation.	As	a	
consequence	of	these	dynamics,	the	European	mode	of	governance	on	demographic	change	issues	
suffers	from	a	lack	of	both	flexibility	and	direction.	It	is	an	important	slow-burning	issue	that	is	captured	
by	neither	the	‘new	intergovernmentalism’	nor	the	‘new	supranationalism’	in	post-crisis	European	
governance	strategies.	Rather,	demographic	change	issues	largely	operate	in	a	vacuum	and	make	only	
sporadic	appearances	on	the	EU	agenda.			
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Introduction:	Europe’s	Demographic	Trends	
	
The	combined	processes	of	demographic	
ageing	–	below	replacement-level	fertility	
rates	and	increasing	life-expectancy	–	
confront	the	EU	with	a	dual	challenge:	one	
economic	and	one	social	(see	also	May	
2005,	p.	836).	First,	as	the	working-age	
population	(WAP)	decreases,	meaning	that	
fewer	people	enter	the	labor	market	than	
leaving,	economic	growth	will	in	the	future	
rely	solely	on	productivity	gains	and	
increases	in	the	employment	rate	of	the	
WAP	(European	Union	2015,	p.	52).	The	
European	WAP	has	started	decreasing	in	
2012	(European	Commission	2012,	p.	57),	
and	it	is	projected	that	this	decline	will	
result	in	a	sustained	decrease	in	the	
number	of	persons	in	employment,	which	
can	no	longer	be	offset	by	increases	in	the	
employment	rate	from	2022	onwards	
(European	Commission	2012,	pp.	29–30).		
	
Historically,	economic	growth	rates	in	the	
EU	were	composed	of	employment	growth	
rates	and	productivity	growth	rates	of	
around	1%	each	annually,	resulting	in	an	
average	of	2%	GDP	growth.	Therefore,	as	
employment	growth	turns	negative,	
productivity	growth	rates	would	in	the	
future	need	to	exceed	2%	annually	to	
maintain	the	desired	levels	of	GDP	growth	
(European	Union	2015,	p.	47)	–	a	scenario	
last	observed	in	1995	for	the	Euro	area	
(European	Central	Bank	2016).	Even	the	
optimistic	projections	of	the	Commission’s	
Ageing	Report	forecast	productivity	growth	
not	to	exceed	1,4%	annually	on	average	for	
the	period	2013-2060	(European	
Commission	2015,	p.	44).	Thus,	
demographic	ageing	will	have	severe	
consequences	for	the	EU’s	economic	
growth	and	global	competitiveness.	
	
Secondly,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	
remarkable	rise	in	life	expectancy	(80.6	
years	in	2013)	is	a	phenomenal	social	
achievement,	this	development	comes	with	
a	serious	social	challenge	as	well.	As	the	
proportion	of	the	WAP	declines	relative	to	
the	young	and	old	cohorts	outside	of	the	
labor	market,	a	shrinking	workforce	will	–	
ceteris	paribus	–	have	to	provide	for	more	
people	outside	the	workforce,	
corresponding	to	a	significant	increase	in	
the	overall	dependency	ratio,1	and	the	old-
age	dependency	ratio	(European	
Commission	2012,	p.	27).2		
	
At	the	same	time,	the	cohort	of	the	so-
called	oldest	old	(85	years+)	is	growing	at	
the	fastest	rate,	implying	that	health	care	
expenditure	will	increase	significantly	
among	member	states	(European	
Commission	2015,	p.	126)	and	that	the	
topics	of	pension	sustainability	and																																									 																					
1	 The	 overall	 dependency	 ratio	 is	 defined	 as	 all	 people	
outside	the	working	age	population	(0-14	years	and	above	
65	 relative	 to	 the	 15-64	 year	 cohort)	 (European	
Commission,	2012,	p.	27).	 It	 is	projected	to	 increase	from	
52.6%	in	2015	to	71.6%	in	2040	(Eurostat,	2017).	
2	The	old-age	dependency	ratio	is	defined	as	the	age	group	
of	 65	 years	 and	 above	 relative	 to	 the	 working	 age	
population	 (15-64	years)	 (European	Commission,	2012,	p.	
27).	 This	 is	 projected	 to	 increase	 from	 28.8	 %	 (2015)	 to	
46.4%	(2040)	(Eurostat,	2017).	
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adequacy	need	to	be	addressed.	Whereas	
pension	sustainability	has	received	a	great	
deal	of	attention	among	EU	member	states,	
which	project	a	stable	share	of	GDP	
spending	on	public	pensions	for	the	period	
2015-2060,	the	adequacy	dimension	has	
according	to	the	OECD	been	neglected	
(OECD	2015,	p.	9).		Indeed,	old-age	poverty	
is	quickly	on	the	rise	in	inter	alia	Germany	
(c.f.	Bertelsmann	2017),	and	fears	about	
losing	national	identities	due	to	
demographic	developments	have	been	
drivers	of	xenophobia	and	right-wing	
populism,	most	notably	in	Germany	where	
former	Bundesbank	manager	Thilo	Sarazin	
became	a	star	of	the	right-wing	movement	
by	linking	the	two	issues	in	his	2010	
bestseller	“Deutschland	schafft	sich	ab”	
(Germany	abolishes	itself).	
	
More	generally	within	Europe,	
demographers	have	suggested	that	without	
raising	taxes	to	address	demographic	
change,	the	decline	of	welfare	states	and	
support	for	European	institutions	is	simply	a	
matter	of	time	(Demeny	2016),	especially	as	
social	unrest	builds	over	issues	such	as	the	
adequacy	of	aged	care	(Cangiano	2014)	or	
the	employability	of	youth.	We	understand	
these	demographic	trends	as	a	challenge	to	
Europe	in	that	these	changes	exert	social	
pressures	that	are	not	immediate	but	can	
fester	over	time.	Demographic	change	
includes	both	obvious	pressures	from	
informal	migration	(a	‘fast-burning’	crisis	in	
2015-6),	as	well	more	‘slow-burning’	
pressures	through	the	realignment	of	social	
expectations	on	issues	such	as	when	to	
form	a	family,	where	job	opportunities	lie,	
etc.	(Seabrooke	and	Tsingou	2016).		
	
Our	approach	is	informed	by	work	in	the	
ENLIGHTEN	project	that	focuses	on	how	
authorities	and	social	actors	view	actualities	
and	narratives	of	change	in	the	European	
Union,	and	on	how	policy	programs	address	
current	social	experiences,	as	well	as	what	
policy	frames	are	being	developed	by	
experts	to	acknowledge	or	redress	changes	
in	social	expectations	(for	the	full	
conceptual	framework	see	Seabrooke	and	
Tsingou	2018).	This	framework	extends	
earlier	insights	from	crisis	management	
literature	(Boin	et	al.	2005)	to	suggest	that	
in	fast-burning	crises	how	authorities	and	
social	actors	understand	the	tempo	and	
intensity	of	change	is	important,	with	an	
emphasis	on	policy	firefighting	and	
alleviating	“external”	shocks	(see	Coman	
2018).		
	
Slow-burning	crises	differ	in	that	the	
primary	activity	is	in	the	diagnosis	of	the	
problem	among	expert	groups	and	
policymakers,	who	can	then	articulate	a	
frame	on	how	to	address	what	is	viewed	as	
a	significant	socio-economic	problem.	If	
these	frames	are	not	developed	then	social	
actors	may	well	change	their	expectations	
on	what	authorities,	such	as	the	European	
institutions,	can	do	for	them,	and	if	they	
should	receive	their	support.	
	
While	the	migration	crisis	was	perceived	as	
a	fast-burning	crisis,	our	investigation	
concentrates	on	how	demographic	change	
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is	viewed	primarily	as	a	slow-burning	crisis	
within	Europe,	or	not	a	crisis	at	all.	We	
establish	how	the	issue	is	being	framed	
within	EC	DGs,	as	well	as	among	external	
experts	(for	a	more	global	application	see	
Seabrooke	and	Tsingou	2015).		
	
In	what	follows	we	discuss:	a)	the	
construction	of	the	“DemEx”	database	
within	the	ENLIGHTEN	project	on	
demography	experts	in	Europe;	b)	the	
practicalities	of	how	the	EU	can	address	
demographic	challenges	through	its	legal	
architecture;	c)	internal	dynamics	within	
the	EC	DGs	on	demographic	change	issues;	
d)	EC-external	expert	dynamics;	e)	dynamics	
among	the	external	expert	community.	
	
	
A. Data	and	Methods	–	Building	the	DemEx	Database		
	
This	paper	relies	on	three	sets	of	data:	
primary	documents	derived	from	EU	output	
related	to	the	demographic	dimension	since	
the	start	of	the	1990s;	an	extensive	social	
network	analysis	(SNA)	based	on	
participation	in	key	events	and	citation	in	
key	policy	outputs;	and	a	range	of	semi-
structured	interviews	with	key	high-level	
professionals	from	within	and	outside	the	
European	Commission.	
	
The	content	analysis	serves	as	a	form	of	
triangulation	(Bowen	2009),	providing	
insights	into	major	trends	across	time	and	
shifting	focus	areas.	A	total	of	55	
documents	were	identified	and	coded	
according	to	the	major	topics	addressed.	
Secondly,	a	novel	dataset	of	demography	
experts	was	created	based	on	participation	
in	23	key	expert	groups,	conferences,	
seminars	and	workshops	since	the	2006	
Communication	“The	Demographic	Future	
of	Europe”	(European	Commission	2006),	
which	marked	a	renewed	ambition	of	the	
European	institutions	to	address	
demography	at	the	EU	level.	This	data	was	
supplemented	by	the	citation	networks	of	
the	flagship	Ageing	and	Demography	
reports.	The	resulting	“DemEx”	Database	
consists	of	856	individuals	(nodes)	tied	
together	through	4,569	affiliations.	
	
To	highlight	interrelations	among	the	
nodes,	standard	centrality	measures	were	
applied,	and	a	Louvain	cluster	analysis	
(Blondel	et	al.	2008)	was	conducted	to	
highlight	community	structures	in	the	field.	
Thus,	the	SNA’s	purpose	is	to	map	the	social	
capital	structures	among	actors	and	to	
identify	key	individuals.	Finally,	11	semi-
structured	interviews	were	conducted	with	
central	nodes	within	the	Commission	and	
among	the	expert	community	to	critically	
assess	the	results	from	the	SNA	and	to	gain	
a	deeper	understanding	of	the	dynamics	
that	drive	the	governance	process.	An	
indicative	set	of	questions	asked	during	
interviews	is	listed	in	Box	1.	
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Box	1.	Interview	themes	
Topic	 Questions	
		
Issue	Distinctions	
What	are	the	major	political	aspects/solutions	to	the	demographic	
challenge?	
	 How	rigid	do	you	perceive	the	borders	between	different	sub-fields	to	
be?	
	 Is	the	EU’s	handling	of	these	issues	facilitating	interdisciplinary	
approaches	and	learning	to	a	satisfactory	extent?	
Expert	Input	 What	types	of	resources	might	lead	to	improved	access	to	the	
Commission?	
	 Are	you	aware	of	ways	in	which	expert	input	is	being	used	by	
Commission	actors?	
Perceptions	of	EU	leadership	 How	has	policy	focus	shifted	over	time?	
	 How	can	one	explain	the	ups	and	downs	in	EU	leadership	on	the	
topic?	
	 How	do	you	perceive	the	current	approach	of	the	EU?	
		 What	role	do	expert	networks	play	in	framing	the	EU	approach?	
		 How	could	the	process	be	improved?	
	
	
B. The	Legal	Basis	for	European	Action	
	
The	demographic	dimension	is	addressed	in	
European	Union	work	at	several	
institutional	stages:	The	European	
Semester,	the	Social	Policy	Committee,	
various	Commission	Directorates	General,	
and	the	European	Parliament.	With	the	
Commission’s	focus	on	establishing	best	
practice	and	defining	examples	of	good	
governance,	thus	defining	role	models	
among	the	member	states,	it	is	worth	
zooming	in	on	the	processes	that	eventually	
define	the	analytical	basis	for	how	
demography	and	ageing	societies	are	
addressed	in	European	discourses.		
	
The	major	sequential	outputs	from	the	EU	
on	the	issue	are	the	Ageing	Reports,	the	
Demography	Reports,	and	the	Pension	
Adequacy	Reports.	
	
The	importance	of	the	analytical	
groundwork	at	the	Commission	is	
reinforced	by	the	mixed	competencies	in	
social	policy-related	fields:	In	many	areas	
related	to	demographic	change,	the	EU	and	
member	states	enjoy	shared	competencies	
for	which	the	principle	of	subsidiarity	gives	
the	right	to	legislation	to	member	states,	
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whereas	the	EU’s	role	is	limited	to	support	
and	complement	member	state	efforts.	
Providing	ideational	guidance	and	
establishing	examples	of	good	governance	
is	thus	essentially	what	the	EU	can	do.	The	
legal	basis	is	thereby	given	by	Article	3	TEU	
and	Article	9	TFEU,	and	the	Charter	of	
Fundamental	Rights	which	inter	alia	
includes	the	right	to	reconcile	family	and	
professional	life	(Article	33),	a	right	to	social	
security	(Article	34)	and	a	right	to	health	
care	(Article	35).	Whereas	implementation	
remains	in	the	hands	of	member	states,	the	
EU	in	general	and	the	Commission	in	
particular	deliver	crucial	analysis	and	
ideational	leadership	to	frame	a	European	
approach	to	the	shared	challenges	of	ageing	
societies	and	demographic	transitions.	
	
The	European	Commission	addresses	
demographic	change	and	ageing	as	
intertwined	phenomena	at	multiple	stages	
with	little	coordination	efforts	between	the	
different	Directorates	General.	Based	on	
the	outputs	produced	and	the	networks	
analyzed,	four	DGs	and	Eurostat	are	
involved	to	different	degrees.		
	
First,	Eurostat	provides	the	analytical	
background	data	on	demographic	
developments	and	economic	and	social	
indicators.		
	
Second,	DG	EMPL	delivers	the	sequential	
Demography	Reports	with	a	focus	on	the	
social	implications	of	societal	changes.		
	
Third,	DG	ECFIN	publishes	the	analytical	
flagship	report	on	the	issue,	called	“Ageing	
Reports”	and	plays	a	crucial	role	in	the	
European	Semester.		
	
Fourth,	DG	HOME	is	involved	to	the	extent	
that	third-country	migration	is	used	in	
relation	to	mitigation	of	demographic	
pressures,	a	concept	most	(in)famously	
associated	with	the	2000	UN	Report	on	
Replacement	Migration.	Lastly,	DG	JUST	is	
involved	in	certain	aspects	related	to	
internal	mobility	and	legal	questions.	
	
The	task	of	understanding	the	EU’s	efforts	
in	the	governance	of	demographic	change	is	
therefore	a	complex	undertaking.	Three	
dimensions	need	to	be	addressed.	
	
First,	how	is	work	at	the	Commission	
coordinated	between	DGs	and	what	is	the	
nature	of	this	coordination?	Is	it	a	spirit	of	
cooperation	or	do	competitive	struggles	
over	alternative	narratives	prevail?	And	
how	are	the	institutional	dynamics	within	
the	Commission	affected	by	fast-burning	
events	that	could	provide	an	impetus	for	
spill-over	effects?		
	
Second,	highlighting	how	Commission	
actors	(DGs)	are	organizing	and	utilizing	
networks	of	external	expertise	can	allow	us	
to	better	understand	where	policy	input	is	
originating	from.	This	is	important	since	the	
complexity	of	the	demographic	issue	
confronts	bureaucrats	with	a	three-fold	
challenge	of	uncertainty,	controversy	and	
open-endedness	that	is	very	similar	to	that	
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of	issues	such	as	internal	mobility	(c.f.	
Hasselbalch	2018).	That	is,	there	remains	a	
degree	of	uncertainty	as	to	the	interaction	
of	processes	resulting	in	demographic	
trends;	the	statistical	picture	does	not	
resemble	popular	mood	(which	is	especially	
the	case	for	the	pension	sustainability	
issue);	and	the	statistical	picture	allows	for	
multiple	policy	equilibria,	the	choice	of	
which	depends	partly	on	the	values	of	
decision-makers	(May	2005,	p.	832).	The	
inclusion	of	external	expertise	can	help	
bureaucrats	to	reconcile	some	of	the	
complexity	and	increase	the	(throughput)	
legitimacy	of	their	position.		
	
Third,	and	following	on	from	the	second	
dimension,	it	is	also	important	to	
understand	the	dynamics	among	the	
external	actors.	What	types	of	actors	do	we	
see?	How	do	they	cooperate,	and	which	
ones	are	crucial	in	establishing	shared	
understandings	of	good	science	and	norms	
and	values?	
	
	
C. Divergence	in	DG	views	on	Demographic	Change	
	
At	the	European	Commission,	the	main	
institutional	actors	are	the	Directorates	
General	for	Employment,	Social	Affairs	and	
Inclusion	(EMPL),	and	Economics	and	
Finance	Affairs	(ECFIN).		
	
Each	DG	publishes	its	own	reports,	the	
Ageing	Report	is	produced	by	ECFIN	and	the	
Demography	Reports	by	EMPL.	The	
different	foci	of	the	reports	are	highlighted	
by	an	analysis	of	the	citation	networks:	for	
example,	the	Reports	published	since	2007	
(five	Demography	Reports	and	two	Ageing	
Reports)	share	only	one	citation.		
	
Additionally,	some	other	characteristics	are	
worth	highlighting.	Academic	citations	in	
the	Ageing	Report	are	attributed	as	follows:	
54%	to	trained	economists	and	7,5%	to	
demographers.	Almost	half	(46%)	of	the	
cited	academics	are	affiliated	with	US	
universities	and	research	institutes.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	Demography	Reports	rely	
to	an	overwhelming	extent	(95,5%)	on	
scholars	from	European	Universities	and	
research	institutes	in	their	academic	
citations.	Scholars	come	from	a	wider	range	
of	academic	backgrounds:	36%	are	trained	
economists,	22%	are	demographers,	and	
others	include	researchers	in	sociology,	
history,	health,	and	medicine.		
	
This	underscores	the	economic	approach	of	
the	ECFIN	department,	and	a	reliance	on	
approaches	that	are	not	embedded	in	the	
specific	contexts	of	the	European	Union.	DG	
EMPL,	on	the	other	hand	favors	an	
approach	that	is	rooted	in	the	European	
context	and	puts	emphasis	on	the	social	
investment	dimension	to	address	
demographic	change.		
	
This	distinction	between	a	monetarist	and	
an	interventionist	camp	along	the	two	
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departments	was	confirmed	to	us	
throughout	multiple	interviews	with	senior	
EC-officials.	It	is	also	in	line	with	other	
research	on	skills	and	‘brain	drain’	issues	in	
the	ENLIGHTEN	project	(Hasselbalch	2018).		
	
In	the	next	stage	of	the	research,	we	see	in	
the	composition	of	Commission	in-house	
experts	that	DG	EMPL	has	the	quantitative	
lead.		
	
First,	the	network	analysis,	which	covers	the	
period	of	2006-2017,	identified	60	out	of	a	
total	of	112	EU	actors	as	Commission	staff	
(plus	10	Eurostat	staff),	thus	highlighting	
the	important	role	of	the	Commission’s	own	
staff	in	the	policy	process.		
	
Second,	within	the	Commission,	56%	of	
actors	were	affiliated	with	DG	EMPL.	DG	
ECFIN	experts	account	for	11%	with	the	
remaining	experts	working	in	DG	HOME,	
JUST,	EAC	and	JRC.		
	
Quantitatively,	there	is	thus	little	doubt	as	
to	the	leading	role	of	DG	EMPL,	a	result	that	
was	confirmed	in	interviews:	DG	EMPL	is	
the	main	agent,	as	stated	by	a	former	
Commissioner	in	an	interview.	This	leading	
role	is	further	manifested	in	the	multiple	
Communications,	Green	Papers	and	White	
Papers	relating	to	demographic	change	
since	2006	under	the	leadership	of	DG	
EMPL.	The	2006	Communication	on	the	
Demographic	Future	of	Europe,	the	2008	
Renewed	Social	Agenda,	the	2010	Green	
Paper	on	Pension,	the	2012	White	Paper	on	
Pension,	the	Social	Investment	Package,	
and	more.	
	
However,	crucially,	the	internal	dynamics	
within	the	Commission	worked	in	another	
direction	as	our	interviewees	continuously	
highlighted:	
	
We	[DG	EMPL]	are	their	[DG	ECFIN’s]	
supplement.	Previously,	we	were	more	
equal	in	the	analytical	processes	and	
political	priorities,	which	we	haven’t	
been	for	a	number	of	years.	Now,	DG	
ECFIN	is	acting	as	the	President’s	right	
hand.	Senior	Official,	DG	EMPL	
	
A	former	senior	official	in	DG	EMPL	noted	
that	in	the	post-crisis	period,	especially	
2011-14,	the	prominence	of	DG	ECFIN	grew,	
so	that	
	
the	Secretary	General	always	took	the	
side	of	the	DG	ECFIN.	Partially	because	
they	were	the	first	ones	to	seriously	
increase	their	power	after	the	crisis	in	
2008	and	2009.”	Former	Senior	Official	
of	DG	EMPL	
	
DG	ECFIN’s	political	priorities	of	stabilizing	
public	finances	in	the	wake	of	the	financial	
crisis	using	austerity	policies	(see	Blyth	
2013)	are	therefore,	according	to	our	
interviewees,	also	dominating	the	overall	
EC	approach	to	the	demographic	issue.		
	
This	can	be	illustrated	by	a	quote	from	a	
personal	advisor	to	President	Juncker,	
maintaining	that	the	demographic	
dimension	was	a	minor	challenge	and	
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nothing	to	be	dealt	with	by	the	
Commission,	which	–	as	the	advisor	claimed	
–	is	right	to	focus	on	the	sustainability	of	
public	finances:	
	
When	you	live	20	%	longer	and	I	take	20	
%	of	your	monthly	pension,	you'll	get	
exactly	the	same	amount.	You	just	feel	
poorer.	These	are	allocational	things	
[…].	People	think	they	have	an	
entitlement	to	retire.	Forget	it!	This	is	
an	insurance	product!	[…]	It’s	a	policy	of	
let	the	markets	rule.	Advisor	to	
President	Juncker.	
	
Not	seeing	demographic	change	as	a	“real	
issue”	and	employing	an	already	existing	
ideational	discourse	stemming	from	a	fast-
burning	crisis,	narrows	the	possibility	of	
experts	to	define	issues	and	introduce	novel	
ideas.	
	
	
D. The	External	Expert	Consensus	
	
With	institutional	supply	of	access	points	
diminishing	and	internal	competition	
between	departments	overshadowing	
substantive	debates,	much	is	left	to	the	
ecology	of	external	experts	to	drive	the	
political	debate.	The	organization	among	
external	experts	is,	however,	limited.		
	
Our	social	network	analysis	captured	587	
external	actors	as	having	been	involved	in	
EU-led	events	and	outputs	related	to	
demographic	change.	Firstly,	external	actors	
are	overwhelmingly	academics.	44%	are	
affiliated	with	Universities	and	a	further	
13%	with	research	institutes.	15%	represent	
interest	groups,	and	the	private	sector	is	
represented	by	10%,	mostly	through	
BusinessEurope.	
	
The	strongest	groups	within	academia	
based	on	their	professional	education	are	
economics	(101),	sociology	(33),	political	
science	(28),	medicine	(27),	demography	
(25),	and	various	aspects	of	health	sciences	
(14).	The	most	significant	institutional	
network	among	these	is	Population	Europe,	
linking	26	individuals.	Importantly,	many	of	
these	feature	prominently	on	the	applied	
centrality	measures:	six	out	of	the	ten	
highest	scoring	external	experts	on	the	
betweenness	score	have	links	to	the	
network.	This	indicates	that	members	of	
this	sub-network	are	well-positioned	to	
broker	and	exert	control	over	information	
flows	within	the	larger	network	by	linking	
several	sub-groups.	
	
The	group	of	Population	Europe	affiliated	
experts	is	relatively	homogenous.	This	is	
true	for	the	social	capital	characteristics	as	
well	as	the	academic	norms	and	values.	
When	the	SNA	is	grouped	into	community	
structures	in	which	all	actors	belonging	to	a	
certain	group	are	closer	to	each	other	than	
to	any	other	node	in	the	network	
(Henriksen	and	Waldstrøm	2016),	we	
observe	that	a	majority	of	experts	affiliated	
with	the	population	network	are	grouped	in	
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the	same	community,	indicating	similar	ego	
networks.	
	
The	demographic	community	of	external	
experts,	defined	as	people	working	
primarily	with	demographic	issues	in	a	
holistic	context	rather	than	sub-sections	
such	as	pensions,	is	densely	connected	and	
exhibits	characteristics	that	allow	few	
outliers.	The	first	characteristic	is	that	the	
field	is	relatively	small	(a	characteristic	of	
relevance	to	demographers	themselves	as	
we	found	in	our	interviews).		
	
This	has	two	implications.	First,	and	most	
obviously,	people	know	each	other	and	are	
in	regular	contact.	Secondly,	the	network	is	
centered	around	research	institutes	(e.g.	
MPIDR,	ViD,	INED,	NIDI,	CED,	and	the	
Oxford	Institute	for	Population	Ageing)	
which	are	regularly	evaluated	for	their	
performance.	These	evaluations	tend	to	be	
done	by	their	peers	from	other	research	
institutes.	As	the	founder	of	Population	
Europe	suggested:	
	
We	all	go	to	the	same	meetings	and	
someone	who	takes	a	PhD	here	goes	off	
to	Vienna	and	the	other	way	around.	So,	
we	all	work	closely	together.	We	
evaluate	each	other	and	give	each	other	
high	grades.		
	
According	to	the	Director	of	the	MPIDR	this	
dense	interaction	results	in	a	field	that	is	
characterized	by	“a	general	spirit	of	
cooperation	and	collaboration”.		
	
The	second	characteristic	is	that	the	field	is	
committed	to	common	academic	norms.	
Demographers	are	data-driven	and	very	
cautious	about	becoming	involved	in	
predictions.	Political	activity	is	not	
incentivized	through	funding	structures.	
Population	Europe,	for	example,	was	
funded	out	of	the	research	budget	of	the	
Max-Planck	institute.	The	effect	is	that	the	
demographic	community	by	and	large	
shows	very	little	commitment	to	get	their	
message	out	to	the	wider	public	and	to	
political	circles.	This	was	particularly	
highlighted	by	the	President	of	the	
Migration	Policy	Institute:	
	
Formal	demographers	don’t	care	much	
about	how	you	might	take	or	not	take	
what	it	is	they	are	offering	in	order	to	
solve	the	particular	problem.	They	are	
creating	a	new	framework	-		a	
theoretical	way	of	thinking	-	on	these	
issues	and	the	necessary	mathematics	
that	will	make	other	formal	
demographers	understand	it	and	move	
the	ball	forward.	
	
Peter	Hall	famously	stated	that	alternative	
policy	ideas	only	gain	traction	and	practical	
leverage	when	they	provide	answers	to	
concrete	political	problems	(Hall	1993,	p.	
290;	Heins	and	de	la	Porte	2015,	p.	XIII).	
However,	in	the	case	at	hand,	introducing	
ideas	and	novel	discourses	about	the	best	
solutions	to	the	substantive	issues	only	
translates	into	power	when	such	discourses	
acknowledge	and	account	for	the	specific	
demands	of	EC	officials;	a	process	that	is	
better	explained	through	the	supply-
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demand	framework	of	Bouwen	(2002).	
Thus,	a	powerful	solution	is	one	that	takes	
into	account	the	power	dynamics	and	
dominant	discourses	within	the	Commission	
and	allows	the	respective	actors	to	
reinforce	or	transform	these	dynamics	in	
the	policy	outcome.	Put	differently,	expert	
advice	is	not	judged	solely	on	the	grounds	
of	its	substantive	contribution	to	the	
solution	of	the	societal	challenge.	Instead,	a	
premium	is	put	on	the	solutions	that	allow	
EC	officials	to	put	these	ideas	into	practice	
with	an	aim	of	legitimizing	their	pre-existing	
policy	enterprise	and	to	introduce	the	ideas	
as	hinges	(Seabrooke	2014,	p.	53)	in	the	
competing	grand	paradigm.	
	
E.			Expert-DG	Interactions	
	
The	Commission	Directorates	engage	
extensively	with	external	experts	in	the	
demographic	field.	This	process	has	been	
largely	institutionalized	through	multiple	
expert	groups,	forums,	conferences	and	
round-table	discussions.	For	the	period	
covered,	586	external	actors	were	
identified,	and	their	links	traced	so	as	to	
allow	to	identify	central	nodes	in	the	
network.	
	
Building	on	the	insights	from	the	previous	
section,	it	is	important	to	understand,	how	
this	engagement	with	external	expertise	
was	facilitated.	Do	experts	have	access	to	
the	powerful	ECFIN	service?	And	if	so,	how	
do	they	differ	from	other	external	actors?	
The	short	answer	is	no.	10	out	of	the	
identified	25	events	and	expert	groups	were	
headed	by	DG	EMPL	including	a	series	of	
demographic	forums,	which	brought	
together	experts	from	academia,	the	
private	sector,	member	states,	and	civil	
society	organizations,	and	played	an	
important	role	in	driving	the	issue	at	the	
employment	service.	
	
The	importance	of	DG	EMPL	as	a	facilitator	
for	access	is	reinforced	by	the	results	of	the	
SNA.	The	closeness	centrality	measure,	
which	provides	a	measure	of	how	close	one	
actor	is	to	everyone	else	in	the	network,	
and	thus	serves	as	a	proxy	for	the	pace	with	
which	one	actor	can	spread	and	obtain	
information	in	the	network,	is	dominated	by	
DG	EMPL	staff.	Indeed,	among	the	entire	EC	
staff,	EMPL	occupies	the	first	ten	positions.	
Policy	input	is	therefore	densely	
concentrated	in	this	DG.	
	
An	advantage	of	such	concentration	is	that	
expert	input	can	more	easily	be	coordinated	
and	translated	into	day-to-day	work.	
However,	it	also	comes	with	a	backlash.	
When	the	Juncker	administration	entered,	
with	it	a	new	set	of	policy	priorities	and	
norms	entered	the	Commission	work.		
	
The	newly	appointed	heads	of	DGs	were	
instructed	to	follow	Juncker’s	approach	of	
focusing	“less	on	the	peanuts”,	and	
according	to	one	interviewee,	they	were	
strategically	chosen	so	as	to	place	
Commissioners	in	DGs	for	which	they	were	
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the	least	in	agreement	with	a	European	
approach.	The	purpose	of	this	maneuver	
was	to	enforce	“professionalism	and	
allegiances”.	
	
For	DG	EMPL,	the	result	was	that	
demographic	change	as	a	free-standing	
issue	with	a	designated	unit	was	dropped	
with	the	departure	of	Commissioner	Andor	
in	2014.		Politics,	as	another	interview	
pointed	out,	was	more	interested	in	the	
short-term	challenges.	Consequently,	with	
perceptions	of	a	fast-burning	Euro	crisis	
dominating	the	political	agenda,	
demography	“was	not	an	issue	at	all”	
(Interview	with	Senior	Official,	DG	EMPL).	
And	moreover,	the	institutional	mandate	
was	to	some	extent	lost.	On	the	question	of	
who	is	responsible	for	demographic	change	
after	the	unit	was	dropped	in	2014,	we	
received	the	following	illuminating	answer:	
	
I	think	it	has	been	less	targeted.	If	you	
ask	me	who	does	demographics,	you	
won’t	get	an	answer.	I	have	a	personal	
interest.	So,	people	would	probably	
approach	me,	but	my	portfolio	doesn’t	
include	explicitly	demographics.	Who’s	
in	charge	with	demographics?	Nobody.	
Senior	Official,	DG	EMPL	
	
In	sum,	then,	the	internal-external	
dynamics	between	Commission	activity	and	
in-sourcing	of	expertise	suffered	a	double	
challenge	originating	on	the	one	hand	from	
the	typical	fate	of	slow-burning	issues	in	
times	of	fast-burning	issues,	and	on	the	
other	hand	a	new	administration	that	
arguably	devoted	fewer	resources	to	the	
topic.		
	
Hence,	with	fewer	resources	and	more	
powerful	competing	issues,	demography	
was	lost	along	the	way.	Key	events	such	as	
the	demography	forums	were	subsequently	
outsourced	to	Population	Europe,	which	is,	
as	discussed	above,	a	network	of	leading	
demography	academics	in	Europe.	This	has	
weakened	the	access	points	for	academic	
experts	to	directly	engage	with	the	
Commission.	
	
To	stimulate	a	policy	direction	on	
demographic	issues	in	2011	Commissioner	
Andor	proposed	to	bring	forward	a	new	
Communication	on	demography.	In	fact,	in	
July	2010	Commissioner	Andor	highlighted	
that	“demographic	change	will	be	one	of	
the	main	challenges	of	my	term	as	
Commissioner”	(Laszlo	Andor,	2010).		
	
This	was	supported	by	the,	at	that	time,	
Director	for	Social	Policies	and	Horizon	
2020.	The	aim	of	this	Communication	was	
to	bring	the	issues	of	ageing,	demographic	
change,	mobility,	migration,	future	trends	
for	the	financing	of	education,	and	health	
care	into	a	single	framework	(Interview	with	
former	Senior	Official	at	DG	EMPL),	thus	
introducing	a	life-course	approach	to	the	
Commission’s	handling	of	demographic	
issues.	There	was	at	that	time	political	will	
and	commitment	within	DG	EMPL	and	
“significant	support”	(Interview	with	former	
Commissioner)	among	member	states	to	
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bring	forward	such	a	Communication.	This	
did,	however,	never	happen.	
	
According	to	a	former	Senior	Official	in	DG	
EMPL,	the	reason	for	the	Communication	to	
be	turned	down	was	twofold:	
	
It	was	stopped	by	the	Commission	and	
the	central	office	of	the	Secretariat	
General	for	two	reasons:	Officially,	
because	demography	was	not	
something	supposed	to	be	dealt	with	in	
social	policy	[…]	and	then	the	migration	
issue.	They	felt	that	we	should	not	talk	
about	migration	because	it	was	
politically	so	explosive.	Former	Senior	
Official,	DG	EMPL	
	
From	the	above	quotes,	two	aspects	
become	apparent.		
	
First,	the	SG	possesses	significant	agenda-
setting	powers	that	can	be	used	to	turn	the	
demographic	issue	into	a	non-issue,	
resulting	in	a	disconnect	between	ageing,	
demographic	change	and	the	social	
dimension,	effectively	ruling	out	a	life-
course	approach.	This	is	reinforced	by	the	
documented	position	of	the	ECFIN	service,	
operating	as	the	SG’s	“right	hand”.		
	
Second,	it	reinforces	the	policy	dilemma	
which	the	EC	faces	when	addressing	“hot	
potato”	aspects	of	the	solution,	in	this	case	
migration,	skewing	the	addressed	
challenges	towards	a	bias	of	mobilization.	
	
However,	this	case	illuminates	the	interplay	
between	internal	dynamics	within	the	
Commission	and	the	use	of	external	experts	
further.	The	demographic	issue	was	not	
dropped	because	the	proposal	for	a	
Communication	was	rejected.	Instead,	it	
was	re-packaged	and	introduced	into	the	
Social	Investment	Package	(SIP).		
	
The	2013	SIP	is	one	of	the	key	EU	responses	
to	the	social	dimension	in	a	post-crisis	
setting	(de	la	Porte	and	Heins	2014).	
Framing	social	policy	as	investment	rather	
than	cost,	the	SIP	can	be	understood	as	a	
break	with	the	dominant	austerity	paradigm	
favored	by	the	EC	at	that	time	(Kvist	2015).	
Demographic	issues	were	deliberately	
placed	into	this	framework	by	DG	EMPL	
with	the	hope	that	they	could	have	a	life	
there	(interview	with	former	
Commissioner).		
	
Nonetheless,	the	challenge	of	explicitly	
addressing	the	issue	of	public	investments	
remained	a	challenge,	with	the	SIP	largely	
viewed	as	a	cost	by	the	DGs,	and	not	an	
investment	(interview	with	former	DG	
EMPL	official).	
		
The	corresponding	expert	group	(“Social	
Investment	for	Growth	and	Cohesion”)	was	
composed	of	12	individuals,	ten	of	which	
were	affiliated	with	universities/research	
institutes.	The	relative	dominance	of	
academics	affiliated	with	
business/economics	universities	(five	
individuals)	was	no	coincidence	as	the	
group’s	informal	task	was	to	translate	the	
known	set	of	solutions	into	a	language	that	
stood	a	chance	of	gaining	ECFIN’s	approval.		
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The	re-packaging	and	integration	of	the	
demographic	material	into	the	SIP	
acknowledged	and	followed	the	dominant	
discourse	of	the	ECFIN	service.	Indeed,	the	
SIP	has	been	criticized	as	being	part	of	the	
monetarist	paradigm	and	leaning	on	supply-
side	politics	(Heins	and	de	la	Porte	2015,	p.	
36;	Streeck	2014).	DG	EMPL	at	that	time	
had	to	show	sensitivity	towards	the	
structural	political	setting,	and	address	the	
social	dimension	of	demographic	change	
without	making	it	too	explicit.	
	
Notwithstanding	the	monetarist	language,	
the	SIP	introduced	aspects	of	lifelong	
learning	(p.	14),	poverty	eradication	(p.	5),	
gender	equality	(p.	7)	and	social	exclusion	
(p.	2)	(European	Commission,	2013).	
Substantially,	then,	the	SIP	is	a	social	
investment	strategy	that	is	“fit	to	cope	with	
many	societal	challenges”	(Kvist	2015,	p.	
147).	However,	the	argument	for	
addressing	demographic	issues	had	to	
remain	in	the	dominant	reasoning	among	
DGs,	and	the	SIP	was	still	viewed	as	a	cost	
(see	also	de	la	Porte	and	Natali	2018).	As	as	
former	DG	EMPL	official	put	it:	
	
At	the	end	demography	became	a	little	bit	of	an	
annex	to	the	SIP	and	was	lost	in	the	whole	thing.	
Former	senior	DG	EMPL	official.	
	
	
Conclusion	
	
In	sum	then,	‘throughput	legitimacy’	in	the	
governance	of	demographic	change	is	
under	pressure	(Schmidt	2016).	Albeit	
formally	living	up	to	the	requirements	of	
open	and	inclusive	policy	processes,	the	
internal	processes	of	the	EC	render	this	
engagement	largely	irrelevant	since	the	
ECFIN	service	exercises	a	form	of	
Deutungshoheit	–	the	capacity	to	have	the	
exclusive	authority	to	interpret	–	over	the	
demographic	issue.		
	
Demographic	issues	have	become	
integrated	into	a	larger	ideational	struggle	
between	interventionist	and	laissez-faire	
paradigms.	Yet	expert	involvement	on	the	
side	of	the	EMPL	service	is	not	solely	
focused	on	gathering	expertise	and	
developing	the	best	solutions	according	to	
the	leading	experts	in	the	field.	Expert	
involvement	also	becomes	a	means	to	
develop	hinges,	adopt	the	language	of	the	
dominant	paradigm	and	introduce	
interventionist	policy	ideas	through	the	
back	door.		
	
The	internal	power	battles	sideline	
accountability	concerns.	The	social	
dimension	of	the	demographic	issue	is	left	
to	the	marginalized	Commission	services	
who	additionally	face	an	unanimity	trap	
since	large	member	states	possess	a	de	
facto	veto	power	for	non-desired	policy	
solutions	such	as,	for	example,	migration.		
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As	such,	because	demographic	change	
issues	exist	in	a	vacuum	they	are	not	part	of	
the	development	of	a	post-crisis	‘new	
intergovernmentalism’	in	the	EU	(Bickerton	
et	al.	2015),	nor	are	they	part	of	the	‘new	
supranationalism’	–	both	modes	of	
governance	require	strong	political	salience	
for	action	(Dehousse	2015;	Schmidt	2016;	
Carstensen	and	Schmidt	2017).	Rather,	in	
accordance	with	our	framework,	
demographic	change	issues	are	viewed	by	
many	as	a	slow-burning	crisis	for	Europe,	
and	by	some	prominent	experts	and	
policymakers	as	not	at	crisis	at	all,	but	an	
issue	that	the	market	will	correct.		
	
The	diffused	management	of	the	
demographic	issue	further	undermines	
transparency	concerns:	with	demographic	
issues	increasingly	being	downgraded	as	a	
background	factor	to	more	pressing	issues,	
it	becomes	difficult	to	get	a	comprehensive	
picture	of	what	the	European	institutions	
are	doing.	
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